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ABSTRACT
We present evidence that fund managers inflate quarter-end portfolio prices with
last-minute purchases of stocks already held. The magnitude of price inflation
ranges from 0.5 percent per year for large-cap funds to well over 2 percent for
small-cap funds. We find that the cross section of inflation matches the cross sec-
tion of incentives from the flow0performance relation, that a surge of trading in
the quarter’s last minutes coincides with a surge in equity prices, and that the
inflation is greatest for the stocks held by funds with the most incentive to inflate,
controlling for the stocks’ size and performance.
QUARTER-END AND ESPECIALLY YEAR-END equity mutual fund prices are abnor-
mally high. We present strong evidence that some mutual fund managers
mark up their holdings at quarter end through aggressive trading of stocks
they already hold. Funds with the greatest ability and most incentive to
improve their performance exhibit the largest turn-of-quarter effect. Intra-
daily data show a surge of transactions and transaction prices in the quar-
ter’s last few minutes, and fund-holdings data show a larger effect in the
funds with the most incentive to mark up. Considering that open-end equity
funds intermediate $3.46 trillion ~year-end 1999!,1 this turn-of-quarter in-
flation of their prices is a significant opportunity for potential sellers, and a
significant hazard for everybody else.
In general, open-end domestic equity mutual funds calculate their net asset
values per share ~NAVs! from the closing transaction prices of their holdings.
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661While there are obvious benefits from pricing off the most recent arms-
length transactions, there are potential concerns as well. One of these, ex-
plored by Chalmers, Edelen, and Kadlec ~2000!, Boudoukh et al. ~2000!, and
others, is the age of thinly traded stocks’ last trades, which allows specula-
tors to profit off longer-term shareholders. The concern we explore here is
the influence of last-minute trading on last-trade prices, which allows fund
managers to move performance between periods with last-minute trading in
stocks they already hold, a practice alternately known as “painting the tape,”
“marking up,” or “portfolio pumping.” Market regulators regard this practice
as illegal. See Sugawara ~2000!.
If managers mark up to move performance to one period from the next,
the result is abnormally high NAVs at period ends. Because of the signifi-
cance of quarterly and annual performance figures, the ends of calendar
quarters—particularly the fourth—are logical targets. We first establish that
quarter-end distortion of NAVs is economically and statistically significant,
then study fund returns, portfolio holdings, stock returns, and stock trades
to determine whether the marking-up tactic is responsible.
We first establish the abnormal-NAV pattern around quarter ends. Equity
fund returns, net of the S&P 500, are abnormally high on the last day of the
quarter, especially the fourth, and abnormally low the next day. This effect
appears in both our database of daily fund returns and in the Lipper daily
fund indices. Magnitudes range from around 50 basis points per year for
large-cap funds to well over 200 basis points for small-cap funds. There is
little or no effect at month-ends that are not quarter-ends.
We then focus in on the cause of the abnormal returns with a sequence of
tests on the cross section of fund and stock returns. We confirm the link
between the quarter-end rise and the next-day decline by showing that larger
increases precede larger decreases in the cross section, which is not the case
for fund returns on other days.
Next, to establish whether mutual fund managers are actively involved,
we check if funds with relatively more incentive to mark up do in fact show
more marking up. We test two hypotheses. First, funds just below the S&P
500 for the year mark up to beat the index ~Zweig ~1997!!, which we call
“benchmark-beating.” Second, funds with the best performance mark up to
improve their year-end ranking and to profit from the convexity of the flow0
performance relation ~Ippolito ~1992!, Sirri and Tufano ~1998!! and manage-
rial incentive pay. We denote this as the “leaning-for-the-tape” hypothesis.
Despite its intuitive appeal, we reject the benchmark-beating hypothesis.
As Degeorge, Patel, and Zeckhauser ~1999! observe, manipulation of a sta-
tistic to beat a benchmark should distort the empirical distribution of the
statistic around the benchmark. In the empirical distribution of funds’calendar-
year returns, there is no distortion around the S&P return, such as De-
george, Patel, and Zeckhauser find in corporate-earnings numbers around
analysts’ expectations, and no distortion around zero return.
However, we find significant evidence supporting the leaning-for-the-tape
hypothesis. We find that the year’s best-performing funds have the largest
662 The Journal of Financeabnormal year-end return reversals, and the quarter’s best-performing funds
have the largest abnormal quarter-end return reversals. Intraday data iso-
late much of the pattern in a small window of trading time around the quarter-
end day’s close. Finally, we find that the stocks in the disclosed portfolios of
the best-performing funds, controlling for capitalization and recent return,
show significantly more price inflation at year-end than do other stocks. We
conclude that marking up by mutual funds explains some, if not all, of the
price inflation.
The rest of the paper is in five sections. Section I covers the relevant
literature on equity and equity-fund returns, and Section II tests for NAV
inflation at period-ends. Section III presents evidence from the cross section
of fund returns. Section IV tests for marking up on transactions data, and
Section V summarizes and concludes.
I. Background and Literature
Two literatures relate to regularities in equity-fund returns: the extensive
literature on equity-return seasonality, and the more recent literature on
equity-fund-return seasonality, which is qualitatively different in both causes
and implications. We cover each briefly, then describe the main hypotheses
of this paper in the context of the literature on equity-fund agency issues,
particularly those relating to the effect of fund performance on net cash
flows.
A. Literature on Equity Return Seasonality
The finance literature has uncovered and analyzed many peculiarities in
equity returns in the days around the year-end. Most attention has focused
on small-cap issues. Relative to big-cap stocks, small-cap stocks shift signif-
icantly upward on each of the five trading days starting with the last of the
year ~Keim ~1983!, Roll ~1983!! with a persistence across years that defies
risk-based explanations. Explanations include tax-loss selling and window
dressing. Tax-loss selling implies that retail investors’ demand for stocks
with poor past performance shifts up after the year-end tax deadline ~e.g.,
Roll ~1983!, and see Ritter ~1988! for evidence that sale proceeds are “parked”
for a while!. Similarly, window dressing implies that institutional demand
for prior poor performers shifts up after year-end portfolio disclosures ~e.g.,
Haugen and Lakonishok ~1988!, Musto ~1997!!. Neither explains why the
shift starts a day before the year-end.2
2 U.S. mutual funds ~with a few exceptions! use trade date 11 positions in calculating their
daily NAV. Therefore, any changes in position that occur through trading on the last day of the
year are not reflected in that day’s NAV, but rather in the next day’s NAV. However, U.S. GAAP
requires that semiannual mutual fund reports reflect trade date positions, so these trades
would be observed in the financial statements of funds with calendar fiscal years.
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~1987! isolates all of equities’ positive average returns in the nine trading
days starting with the last of the month. Various explanations are consid-
ered and discarded. Sias and Starks ~1997! find that greater institutional
ownership is associated with relatively better returns in the last four days of
the year, and relatively worse in the first four days of the year, and conclude
that individual-investor tax-loss selling explains their finding. However, the
average returns are virtually the same over these two periods, so they con-
clude it is actually the unusually poor performance of low institutional own-
ership stocks at the end of the year, and their good performance at the
beginning of the year, that drives their results.
At the intraday frequency, Harris ~1989! shows that transaction prices
systematically rise at the close, and that this “day-end” anomaly is largest at
month-ends ~the study did not consider quarter- or year-ends separately!
and when the last transaction is very near to the close in time. Harris also
finds that the effect is stronger for low-priced firms and that buyers more
frequently initiate day-end transactions.
The literature also documents price shifts directly traceable to institu-
tional money management. Harris and Gurel ~1986! show that prices on new
constituents of the S&P 500 index abnormally increase more than three per-
cent upon announcement, all of which is eliminated within two weeks. Lynch
and Mendenhall ~1997!, studying a period when S&P additions and dele-
tions were announced several trading days in advance, show transaction
prices to be temporarily low on deletion days and high on addition days, and
Reed ~2000! confirms this for Russell 2000 additions and deletions. This
effect is understood to be caused by the rebalancing trades of index managers.
B. Literature on Equity-fund Return Seasonality
It might seem redundant to measure the seasonality of equity-fund re-
turns, because we might expect to see only the previously discussed equity-
return patterns. But the return on an equity fund is fundamentally different
from the return on an equity, and the significance of this difference is only
recently being addressed in the literature.
An equity return represents the difference between the prices of two arms-
length transactions. It tells us what an investor would have earned if he
bought at the initial price and sold at the later price. We cannot know how
much, if any, another investor could have transacted at these prices, as they
are specific to the size and direction, and possibly other circumstances, of
those two trades. In many cases, we abstract from transaction times, which
is a minor concern for heavily traded stocks but not for the sparsely traded
ones. An alternative is to look instead at bid and ask prices, but these, too,
are only relevant for trades of a specific size.
An equity-fund return represents the difference between two NAV calcu-
lations, where each NAV is calculated from the closing prices of the fund’s
holdings on their respective primary exchanges. In contrast to an equity
664 The Journal of Financeprice, the NAV is the actual transaction price used for purchases and re-
demptions of fund shares after the close that day. However, it is unlikely
that an investor could purchase or sell all of the fund’s equity positions at
the closing prices used to calculate NAV. So NAVs directly represent the
experience of hypothetical investors, without the guesswork and error, but they
can depart from the “equilibrium” value of fund shares whenever equities’
closing prices depart from their equilibrium values. When this departure is
predictable, investors have a trading rule whose profits derive from the funds’
other shareholders.
Some recent studies illustrate the predictability caused by nonsynchro-
nous trading. Nonsynchroneity is most extreme in funds holding non-U.S.
equities that price these holdings using closing trades on their home ex-
change, yet allow fund purchases and redemptions up to the close of U.S.
trading ~Goetzmann, Ivkovic, and Rouwenhorst ~2000!!. But even purely do-
mestic funds allow arbitrage to the extent they hold equities whose last
trades tend to precede the market close ~e.g., Boudoukh et al. ~2000!, Chal-
mers et al. ~2000!, Greene and Hodges ~2000!!. These profit opportunities
are sporadic and require good estimates of the magnitude of market moves
between non-U.S. and U.S. market closes for international funds, or shortly
before the U.S. close for funds holding illiquid stocks.
In the popular press, Zweig ~1997! demonstrates year-end seasonality in
equity funds, and offers an explanation. From 1985 to 1995, the average
equity fund outperformed the S&P 500 by 53 bp ~bp 5 basis points, 10100 of
one percent! on the year’s last trading day, and underperformed by 37 bp on
the next year’s first trading day. Small-cap funds shifted more: 103 bp above
the S&P, then 60 bp below. This does not match the price shifts of small-cap
equity indices, which generally beat the market on both days in those years.
The explanation offered is that some fund managers cause the pattern by
manipulating year-end valuations to improve their fund’s return.
In SEC terminology, “marking the close” is “the practice of attempting to
influence the closing price of a stock by executing purchase or sale orders at
or near the close of the market” ~see Kocherhans ~1995!!. Zweig ~1997! pro-
poses that the fund managers just short of the S&P 500 on the year’s pen-
ultimate trading day try to pass it by marking the last day’s close with buys.
At the least, they could simply increase the probability their holdings close
at the ask, but with more aggressive purchases, they could push up both the
bid and the ask. Either way, this “marking up” would result in inflated
NAVs and thereby inflated returns for holding periods ending on that date,
and correspondingly deflated returns over periods beginning then.
C. Two Models of the Marking-up Strategy
We consider two models, not mutually exclusive, of the marking-up strat-
egy. The first is the scenario just described in which managers mark up to
beat the S&P, which we label the “benchmark-beating” model. The idea that
funds mark up to beat the S&P 500 has intuitive appeal; a fund’s success at
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spectuses and annual reports, so it would seem that investors would reward
it with new investment. Interestingly, however, they do not. A recent com-
parative study of the flow0performance relation in the mutual fund and pen-
sion fund industries, Del Guercio and Tkac ~2000!, finds new investment
increases with performance in both segments, but beating the S&P 500 brings
significant new investment only to pension funds, not to mutual funds. So if
a reward mechanism encourages marking up to beat the S&P 500, it is prob-
ably something other than expectations of new investment. For example,
managers’ bonus plans might reward outperforming the S&P 500.
The second model is suggested by the convex relation between past per-
formance and subsequent net fund flows. As Ippolito ~1992! and Sirri and
Tufano ~1998! show, net flows are much more sensitive to the difference
between two high returns than between two lower returns, so that fund
managers get more benefit from rank improvements if they are near the top
of the distribution. This further implies that on the last day of a reference
period, fund managers get more benefit from moving performance to that
period from the next if their period-to-date performances are near the top of
the distribution. They are in the high-slope region of the relation for this
period and not particularly likely to be there for the next ~Hendricks, Patel,
and Zeckhauser ~1993!, Brown and Goetzmann ~1995!, Carhart ~1997!!, which
increases their incentive to move performance from the next reference pe-
riod. Marking up at period end moves performance from the next period. So
in the second model, which we label the “leaning-for-the-tape” model ~pic-
ture runners at the finish line!, funds mark up at the end of a reference
period to improve a superior performance.
The primary reference period would intuitively be the calendar year. Re-
turns over calendar years figure disproportionately in the analysis of fund
performance in the press, in mutual fund ratings and databases, and in the
academic literature. And managers’ bonus plans are typically described as
calendar-year based. Calendar quarters would be a secondary target, given
their prominence in the press ~e.g., the Wall Street Journal’s quarterly pull-
out section!, in shareholder reports ~e.g., the quarterly mailings to pension-
plan participants!, and elsewhere.
Since the two models isolate marking-up activity in different sets of funds—
average performers ~i.e., near the S&P! in one case, top performers in the
other—it might seem they are easy to distinguish in the data. But the con-
centration of mutual fund holdings in certain equities serves to blur this
distinction.
If funds “herd” to certain equities, as is suggested by Lakonishok, Shleifer,
and Vishny ~1992!, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers ~1995!, and Karceski
~1999!, and a few determined fund managers mark up some of these secu-
rities, then other funds will benefit from the marking effect of these man-
agers. Those responsible may not even manage mutual funds; calendar-year
and quarter returns are also important in other institutional-investor cat-
egories, such as pension and hedge funds. Pension and hedge fund managers
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So even if only the benchmark-beating hypothesis is correct, funds in gen-
eral would show at least some of the same return seasonality. And the same
applies if only the top-performing hedge funds are marking up. So it is not
enough to show that the NAVs of some funds go up then down; we also have
to test against these alternative passive scenarios.
II. NAV Inflation at Quarter-ends
In this section, we show that equity funds are overpriced at the close of
calendar quarters, in the sense that investors who sell at the quarter-end
NAV earn abnormally high returns, and those who buy earn abnormally low
returns. This is apparent both in the Lipper mutual fund indices and in our
own database of individual equity funds. The Lipper time series are useful
in that they are popular references regarding fund performance ~e.g., daily
in the Wall Street Journal!; they extend through July 7, 2000; and they sort
funds along dimensions of interest. The results from our own database ex-
tend back further and also permit us to refine our tests on the cross section
of the funds and of funds’ holdings. Since the time period over which this
return accrues is only one day, our results are insensitive to our model of
equity market equilibrium.
A. Tests Using Lipper Mutual Fund Indices
Lipper produces many equity-fund indices. We use the nine “style” indices
that constitute a three-by-three sort of the equities concentrated in $Small-
cap, Mid-cap, Large-cap% by $Value, Core, Growth%, and are available daily
from July 13, 1992, through the present. These indices allow us to relate our
results on NAV inflation to the well-documented ~e.g., Fama and French
~1992!! variation of average equity returns with size and book-to-market
value. From the return on the Lipper style indices, we subtract the return on
the Lipper index of S&P 500 funds3 to obtain excess returns.
If NAVs are inflated at quarter- and year-ends, we should observe abnor-
mally high returns on the last day of each quarter and year, and abnormally
low returns on the first day. Let Ri,t denote the daily excess return of style
index i on day t,f o rtfrom July 14, 1992 ~the first return we can calculate!,
to July 7, 2000 ~the last date when we downloaded Lipper data!, and run the
following OLS indicator-variable regression:
Ri,t 5 bi,01bi,1YENDt 1 bi,2YBEGt 1 bi,3QENDt
1 bi,4QBEGt 1 bi,5MENDt 1 bi,6MBEGt 1 ei,t
~1!
3 The Lipper index values, and therefore returns, are based on the total returns of their
constituent funds, where total returns are calculated by reinvesting dividends on their ex-dates.
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otherwise. Similarly, QENDt and MENDt are one on the last day of a calen-
dar quarter that is not a year end, and the last day of a month that is not a
quarter end, respectively. The variables YBEGt, QBEGt, and MBEGt are
defined analogously, except that they are for the first day of the period. We
present the fitted coefficients from these nine regressions in Panels A ~YEND
and YBEG!,B~ QEND and QBEG!, and C ~MEND and MBEG! of Table I.
The results indicate a strong two-day return reversal pattern across month-
end, quarter-end, and year-end periods, especially for small-cap and growth
funds. The results are strongest for quarter- and year-ends: Of the 36 coef-
ficients in Panels A and B, all but one are in the predicted direction, and all
but four are statistically significant at the 10 percent level. In addition, the
magnitudes decrease strongly in market capitalization, and increase moder-
ately from value to growth. Finally, the evidence in Panel C around non-
quarter-end month ends is weak. There is a small and generally statistically
significant increase on the last day of the month, but almost nothing the
next day.
To test whether the reversal pattern is significantly more intense at quarter-
ends than at other month-ends, we rerun the nine regressions with the vari-
ables regrouped so that the second and third coefficients pick the marginal
effect of being a quarter-end ~including year-end! in addition to being a
month-end:
Ri,t 5 bi,01bi,1~YENDt 1 QENDt! 1 bi,2~YBEGt 1 QBEGt!
1 bi,3~YENDt 1 QENDt 1 MENDt!~ 2 !
1 b i ,4~YBEGt 1 QBEGt 1 MBEGt! 1 ei,t.
The results, in Panel D, again show widespread significance. All but one are
in the right direction, and all but three are statistically significant at the
five percent rejection level.
The magnitudes of the abnormal returns are quite large, especially con-
sidering they accrue over just a few days in a year. In small-cap growth
funds, the quarter-ending positive abnormal returns total 435 basis points
per year, and the quarter-beginning negative returns sum to 2345 basis
points. For our purposes, it is clear that quarter-end prices are inflated in
that selling at those prices delivers economic profits, and there is little of
this inflation at other month ends. Further, abnormal returns of this size
are unlikely to be compensation for risk.
B. Tests Using Daily Individual Mutual Fund Returns
To further analyze period-end abnormal returns, we construct a database
of daily returns on 2,829 funds using daily price, dividend, and dividend
reinvestment NAV data from Micropal. Our database consists of diversified
open-end equity mutual funds in the aggressive growth, growth and income,
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Excess Returns, in Basis Points, of the Lipper Mutual Fund
Indices around Period-ends
Nine of the Lipper mutual fund total-return indices are a three by three sort of equity funds,
$Small-cap, Mid-CAP, Large-cap% by $Value, Core, Growth%. There is also an index of S&P 500
funds. Daily index levels begin July 13, 1992, and run through July 7, 2000, a total of 2019
trading days. For each of the nine indices, we calculate its daily return net of the S&P-fund
index and then for Panels A, B, and C we regress this excess return on six 100 indicator vari-
ables: YEND ~last trading day of the year!, YBEG ~first of the year!, QEND ~last of a calendar
quarter other than the fourth!, QBEG ~first of a calendar quarter other than the first!, MEND
~last of a month but not the last of a quarter!, and MBEG ~first of a month but not the first of
a quarter!. The coefficients are arranged into panels: YEND0YBEG in Panel A, QEND0QBEG
in Panel B, and MEND0MBEG in Panel C. For Panel D, we use only four 100 variables:
YEND 1 QEND, YBEG 1 QBEG, YEND 1 QEND 1 MEND, and YBEG 1 QBEG 1 MBEG, and
we report the coefficients on the first two 100 variables analogously to the other panels. Results
are in basis points. Each of the 18 time-series regressions has 2018 observations.
For Panels A, B, and C the model is
Xt 5 b0 1 b1YENDt 1 b2YBEGt 1 b3QENDt 1 b4QBEGt 1 b5MENDt 1 b6MBEGt 1 et.
For Panel D, the model is
Xt 5 b0 1 b1~YENDt 1 QENDt! 1 b2~YBEGt 1 QBEGt! 1 b3~YENDt 1 QENDt 1 MENDt!
1 b4~YBEGt 1 QBEGt 1 MBEGt! 1 et.
Small-cap Mid-cap Large-cap
Panel A: Turn of the Year,
YEND0YBEG Coefficients
Value 141**0230 120**0234* 25**0217**
Core 153**0253** 155**0273** 30**0220**
Growth 174**0296** 157**0278** 37**0233**
Panel B: Turn of Calendar Quarters Other than Fourth,
QEND0QBEG Coefficients
Value 59**0233** 31**0214 405
Core 71**0252** 60**0255** 8**025*
Growth 87**0283** 69**0282** 15*0217**
Panel C: Turn of Months Other than Quarter-ends,
MEND0MBEG Coefficients
Value 25**029 10**012 6**022
Core 21**022 25**021 4**021
Growth 28**06 26**064 0 4
Panel D: Quarters versus Other Months,
YEND 1 QEND0YBEG 1 QBEG Coefficients
Value 55**0224* 43**0231** 402
Core 70**0250** 59**0259** 9**028**
Growth 81**0292** 65**0287** 17**0225**
* Significantly different from zero at 10 percent rejection level.
** Significantly different from zero at 5 percent rejection level.
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from January 2, 1985, to August 29, 1997. There is some survivor bias in the
early years of Micropal data.4 We calculate total-return time series ~reinvest-
ing dividends on ex-dates! and also create four equal-weighted fund indices:
one for each of the fund categories above, and one for all funds in our sam-
ple. For each index, we define its excess return as its own return minus that
of the S&P 500 index ~which does not include dividends; we do not use the
Lipper index of S&P 500 funds as it is not available daily for much of this
period!. We run the indicator-variable regression ~1!, described above, and
report the results in Panel A of Table II.
These results mirror those from Lipper. Fund prices are significantly in-
flated at quarter ends, especially year ends, and there is little or no infla-
tion at other month ends. While these tests show that the mean return is
higher on quarter ends, it is also important to ask if this inflation is wide-
spread across funds. To address this, we estimate regression ~1! again, but
replace the dependent variable with the percentage of funds that outper-
formed the S&P on that day. We show these results in Panel B of Table II.
We find 80 percent of funds beating the S&P on the last day of the fourth
quarter, compared to 37 percent beating the S&P the next day. At the turn
of other quarters, 62 percent beat the S&P on the last day, and 40 percent
the next. In the fund categories, we see the strongest results among aggres-
sive growth funds—91 percent and 34 percent around the year-end, 70 per-
cent and 34 percent around other quarter-ends—and the weakest among
growth and income funds. Since growth and income is closest to the value
categorization of Lipper, the pattern across fund categories matches that of
Table I.
Tables I and II show that equity funds are significantly overvalued at the
ends of quarters, especially the fourth, compared to just before and after.
We see this in the Lipper indices, in our own database, and in the fraction of
funds beating the S&P 500. The inflation cuts across styles, but it is stron-
gest in funds with a small-cap or growth orientation. It is worth noting that
this is not a projection of any previously reported regularity in equity re-
turns. The quarter-end results are completely novel, and the year-end results
are not indicated in the extensive year-end literature.5 Further, as discussed
above, there are no market microstructure issues surrounding mutual fund
NAVs like there are with individual stock prices, making the results all the
more meaningful.
4 For example, zero of the 463 funds with Micropal data for some of 1985 die in 1985, whereas
one of the 493 similarly defined funds in the CRSP monthly mutual fund database with data for
some of 1985 dies in 1985. The analogous numbers for 1990 are 29 out of 807 in Micropal and
8 of 700 in CRSP, and for 1995 it is 66 of 2,063 in Micropal and 67 of 1,979 in CRSP.
5 The closest would probably be Table III of Sias and Starks ~1997!, which addresses a dif-
ferent frequency ~annual!, a different category of institutions ~all of them!, and finds very
different numbers. Sias and Starks also conclude that most of the turn-of-the year effect is due
to individual investor trading, whereas we find strong evidence of turn-of-the-year effects due
to specific institutions ~mutual funds! trading.
670 The Journal of FinanceThe strong evidence of NAV inflation at the ends of March, June, and
September rejects exclusively year-end explanations such as tax-loss selling.
The scant evidence around the non-quarter month ends also discounts the
possibility of monthly explanations such as transfers to retirement accounts.
Does it reflect managers marking up their portfolios? The stronger results
in small-cap funds support this view, since the closing prices of less-liquid
stocks would presumably be easier to influence. If managers are marking
up, are they marking up to beat benchmarks, or to make good performances
better? The next section runs a series of empirical tests on the cross section
of funds to further examine the quarter-end behavior.
Table II
Month-end Mutual Fund Price Shifts
Model is
Xt 5 b0 1 b1YENDt 1 b2YBEGt 1 b3QENDt 1 b4QBEGt 1 b5MENDt 1 b6MBEGt 1 et.
In Panel A, the dependent variable in each regression is an equal-weighted index of funds, first
the aggressive growth ~AG!, growth and income ~GI!, and long-term growth ~LG! categories
together, and then separately. In Panel B, the dependent variable is the fraction of funds in the
indicated universe that beat the S&P 500 for that day. YENDt i s1i ftis the last trading day of
December; YBEGt i s1i fYENDt21 is 1; QENDt i s1i ftis the last trading day of March, June,
or September; and QBEGt i s1i fQENDt21 is 1; MENDt i s1i ftis the last day of January,
February, April, May, July, August, October, or November; and MBEGt i s1i fMENDt21 is 1.
Panel A is in basis points, Panel B is in percentage points, and two-sided p-values for the null
hypothesis of a zero coefficient are below in italics, reported as percentages. Each regression
has 3201 daily return observations, covering January 3, 1985, through August 29, 1997.
Xb 0 b 1 b 2 b 3 b 4 b 5 b 6
Panel A: Dependent Variable Is Index Return
All 20.28 53.01 225.35 16.27 211.76 1.74 6.91
68.23 0.01 1.37 0.71 5.15 63.97 6.49
Aggressive growth only 20.67 95.38 238.18 34.61 221.25 8.60 10.65
50.60 0.01 1.14 0.01 1.66 11.57 5.26
Long-term growth only 20.16 47.08 225.35 12.02 29.34 0.79 6.22
80.02 0.01 0.82 3.28 9.71 82.02 7.48
Growth and income only 20.06 22.29 212.97 5.35 26.25 23.25 4.53
91.10 0.92 11.50 26.79 19.6 27.51 13.02
Panel B: Dependent Variable Is Percentage of Funds Above S&P 500
All 50.52 29.60 213.15 11.54 210.19 1.85 7.00
0.01 0.01 6.50 0.59 1.49 47.49 0.70
AG only 50.55 40.00 216.68 19.67 216.22 6.68 7.50
0.01 0.01 4.70 0.01 0.10 2.81 1.42
LG only 50.41 29.93 215.00 10.77 29.27 1.41 6.80
0.01 0.01 3.63 1.05 2.75 58.72 0.91
GI only 50.64 19.85 26.85 5.15 25.71 21.98 6.97
0.01 0.61 32.50 20.71 16.27 43.21 0.59
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The first question we address is whether the end-of-quarter positive re-
turn is related to the beginning-of-quarter negative return. It does not have
to be. There could be one force raising fund returns on the last day of the
quarter, and another independent force reducing them the next day. If the
return effects are related, they should correlate negatively in the cross sec-
tion of funds, since a relatively more-inflated NAV should both drive up the
quarter-end return and drive down the quarter-beginning return. So the
empirical question is whether the cross-sectional relation between funds’
day t and day t 2 1 returns is more negative when t is the first day of a
quarter.
We answer the question with a two-stage regression technique. The first
stage is a cross sectional regression of funds’ day t excess returns on their
own day t 2 1 excess returns for all days in our sample. The model is
Rf,t 5 b0,c,t 1 b1,c,t Rf,t21 1 ef,t, ~3!
where Rf,t is fund f ’s excess ~of the S&P 500 index! day t return, and
f indexes all the funds in one of the four categories c: aggressive growth
funds, growth and income funds, long-term growth funds, and all funds to-
gether. So for each category c, we have a time series of 3,200 cross-sectional
slope coefficients b1,c,10301985, b1,c,10401985,...b1,c,802901997.I nt h esecond-
stage regression, we establish whether these slope coefficients are signifi-
cantly lower when t is the first day of a quarter. The model is
b1,c,t 5 l0,c 1 l1,cYBEGt 1 l2,cQBEGt 1 l3,cMBEGt 1 ec,t, ~4!
where YBEG, QBEG, and MBEG are defined as before. The hypothesis
is that YBEG and QBEG enter negatively. We report the results in
Table III.
The second-stage regressions show the predicted effect. The generally pos-
itive intercepts show that there is a slight positive autocorrelation of excess
returns. Relative performance reverses around quarter ends, with signifi-
cantly negative coefficients on all four QBEG and three of the four YBEG
variables.6 One lesson is that conditional performance persistence can be
very different from unconditional performance persistence, at least at this
frequency. For this study, the important lesson is that the quarter-end high
return and the next-day low return have a common cause in the inflated
quarter-end NAV.
6 It may be puzzling that the coefficient on QBEG is larger in the all-funds results than in
the category results, but this simply reflects the variation of the intensity of the pattern across
categories.
672 The Journal of FinanceA. Marking Up to Beat a Benchmark
The hypothesis that funds mark up to beat benchmarks is analogous to
the hypothesis tested in Degeorge et al. ~1999! that firms manage earnings
to exceed thresholds. In the former case, funds’ discretion over calendar-year
performance comes from their influence over their holdings’ closing prices,
and in the latter case, firms’ discretion over quarterly earnings-per-share
numbers comes from flexible accounting practices, such as the dating of
stale-inventory markdowns. But in either case, the discretion allows man-
agers to move performance between periods, nudging it over hurdles it would
have failed.
One way to test the benchmark-beating hypothesis is the approach of De-
george et al. ~1999! of referring to the empirical distribution of performance
around the benchmarks. The strategy should distort the distribution around
the benchmarks by pushing observations from just below the benchmarks to
just above. Degeorge et al. ~1999! show the distribution of earnings-per-
share numbers to be distorted around common benchmarks such as ana-
lysts’ estimates and zero. There is an extra mass in the empirical distribution
at or slightly above the benchmark, compared to slightly below. If funds
mark up to beat the S&P 500, we should find the analogous result in the
distribution of calendar-year fund returns: an extra mass at or slightly above
the calendar-year total return of the S&P 500, relative to slightly below.
Table III
Daily Cross-sectional Regressions on Lagged Returns
Rf,t is the return of fund f on day t from January 2, 1985, to August 29, 1997. There are four
categories c of funds: aggressive growth ~AG!, growth and income ~GI!, long-term capital gains
~LG!, and all funds put together ~ALL!. For each t from January 3, 1985, through August 29,
1997, and for each c we run a cross-sectional regression Rf,t 5 b0,c,t 1 b1,c,tRf,t21 1 gf,t of
the day t returns of the funds in category c on their own day t 2 1 returns, saving the fitted
slope coefficient b1,c,t. Then for each c we run a second-stage regression of the time series
b1,c,10301985, b1,c,10401985,...b1,c,802901997 on three dummy variables: YBEGt, which is 1 if t 2 1i s
the last trading day of December; QBEGt, which is 1 if t 2 1 is the last trading day of March,
June, or September; and MBEGt, which is 1 if t 2 1 is the last trading day of any other month:
b1,c,t5 l0,c 1 l1,cYBEGt 1 l2,cQBEGt 1 l3,cMBEGt 1 gc,t Two-sided p-values for the null
hypothesis of a zero coefficient are below, in italics, reported as percentages. Each second-stage
regression has 3200 observations.
l0 l1 l2 l3
All 0.037 20.197 20.164 20.039
0.01 1.98 0.06 19.11
AG 0.049 20.175 20.100 0.011
0.01 5.41 5.16 73.76
LG 0.040 20.088 20.123 20.035
0.01 31.49 1.24 24.9
GI 20.018 20.240 20.148 20.056
0.28 1.28 0.64 9.58
Evidence of Gaming Behavior in Equity Mutual Funds 673To execute this test, we need the total annual return of each fund and of
the S&P 500. Both are complicated by dividend-reinvestment policies. For
total fund returns, we use the annual returns from the CRSP mutual fund
database because they assume dividend reinvestment on payment dates ~not
ex-dates!, the reinvestment policy assumed by funds in their reported total
returns. Calculation of the S&P’s total return is not standardized; we use
the figures from the SBBI yearbook calculated by Ibbotson Associates, since
they appear to be most frequently referenced in annual reports and the fi-
nancial press. To avoid allowing precision differences to affect our results
~SBBI figures use two decimal places, while CRSP uses more!, we round off
all return figures to one decimal place.7 We say a fund tied the S&P if its
rounded-off return matches the S&P’s rounded-off return and that it beat
the S&P if its rounded-off return is higher.
Our sample includes all full-year returns of aggressive growth, growth
and income, and long-term growth funds ~excluding index funds! on CRSP
from 1985, the beginning of our daily data, through 1998, the end of the
CRSP data. This yields 15,541 fund-years. The empirical distribution of the
fund returns minus the S&P 500 is in Figure 1A. The bin corresponding to
tying the S&P 500 is labeled 0.0%, and the bin corresponding to beating the
S&P 500 by 0.1% is labeled 0.1%. The mode is about one-half percent below
zero, as would be expected from previous mutual fund research.
If there is a benchmark-beating distortion of the distribution, it is small.
Over the 14 years, 86 funds fell 0.1 percent below the S&P 500, 81 funds
equaled the S&P 500, and 74 funds landed 0.1 percent above. The test sta-
tistic of Degeorge et al. ~1999! is not significant8 for either the change from
20.1 percent to 0.0 percent or the change from 0.0 percent to 0.1 percent.
Perhaps it is too much to expect the Degeorge et al. ~1999! test to detect
S&P 500 gaming, considering other sources of variance in fund and S&P
returns. It may be easier to detect zero-return gaming; that is, marking up
to be positive for the year. Zero is a static target, unlike the S&P, although
the variance of a fund relative to zero is generally larger than its variance
relative to an index, which may make zero a more difficult benchmark.
We test the hypothesis that funds mark up to be positive by repeating the
methodology on funds’ unadjusted total returns. Figure 1B shows the dis-
tribution of the same funds’ total returns ~rounded to 0.1 percent!. Again,
any effect is small, as there are 25 funds at 20.1 percent, 31 funds at 0.0
percent, and 34 funds at 0.1 percent. As before, the Degeorge et al. ~1999!
7 The results are insensitive to bin size or return precision.
8 The proximity of the peak puts us in Case A1 of Section II of the Appendix of Degeorge
et al. ~1999!. Since we do not know the exact expected peak, we calculate the t-statistic for
various windows, and the value of t is never higher than 0.5 for the difference between the
populations of the 20.1 percent and 0.0 percent bins, and is never higher than 0.2 for the
difference between the populations of the 0.0% and 0.1% bins. The distribution of t under
the null, according to Degeorge et al. ~1999!, is the Student-t.
674 The Journal of FinanceFigure 1. Distribution of Annual Fund Returns around Benchmarks. Panel A: Distribu-
tion of fund calendar-year total returns ~rounded off to 0.1 percent! minus S&P total returns
~rounded off to 0.1 percent!. All AG, GI and LG funds, 1985-98. Only excess returns within
1 percent of 0 percent are represented. Panel B: Distribution of fund calendar-year total re-
turns, rounded off to 0.1 percent. All AG, GI and LG funds, 1985–98. Only excess returns within
1 percent of 0 percent are represented
Evidence of Gaming Behavior in Equity Mutual Funds 675test statistic finds the bin differences to be statistically insignificant.9 So we
do not find the footprint consistent with marking up to beat benchmarks.
The Del Guercio and Tkac ~2000! finding that investors do not reward
funds for beating the S&P 500 matches our finding that funds do not mark
up to beat it. That funds moving ahead of the S&P 500 on the last day
outnumber the funds falling behind it is a result of the high-mean distribu-
tion, not a cause.10
B. Marking Up to Improve a Good Performance
The cross-sectional prediction of the leaning-for-the-tape model is that the
funds with the best year-to-date performance as of the second-to-last day of
the year have the greatest NAV inflation on the last day. That is, we should
expect some inflation among funds in general due to herding, but we should
see more inflation among the funds that are actively trying to inflate, and
this model identifies top performers as the active ones.
We start with a graph. For each of the 12 year-ends with daily data—
beginning with 1985 to 1986 and ending with 1996 to 1997—we sort funds
by year-to-date return, up to the second-to-last day, into five-percent-wide
fractile bins and then calculate the average excess ~of the S&P 500 index!
return on the last day of the year and on the first day of the next year. So for
each fractile bin, we have 12 observations of the two days surrounding the
turn of the year. We take the average across the 12 year-ends and plot the
averages as Figure 2A.
The predicted cross-sectional variation is apparent in the relative means.
The average year-end rise is 111 bp for the top five percent, compared to the
62 bp average of the other bins, and the average year-beginning drop is
64 bp, compared to a 35 bp average across the other bins. To establish the
statistical significance of the top-funds0other-funds difference we can deploy
the dummy-variable model from Tables I and II, but with the dependent
variable replaced by a top-funds minus other-funds long-short portfolio. We
can also sort funds into categories, to see if category-relative performance is
influential.
For each trading day t from December 31, 1985, to August 29, 1997, we
sort funds both within and across categories by performance over the prior
252 trading days ending day t 2 1. The top 10 performers are assigned to the
9 This is far away from the peak, so we are in the case described in Section I of the DeGeorge
et al. ~1999! appendix. Regardless of how big a window we use to calculate the statistic, it is not
significant. For example, with six bins on either side, we calculate t 5 0.89 for the difference
between the 20.1 percent bin and the 0.0 percent bin, and t 5 0.54 for the difference between
the 0.0% bin and the 0.1% bin.
10 Previous versions ~available on request! showed this explicitly by showing that the num-
ber of funds moving ahead of versus behind the S&P on the last day is very similar to the
number that would occur if a fund’s probability of getting the return it needs to beat a bench-
mark equals the fraction of other funds in the same category and year that got at least that
return.
676 The Journal of FinanceFigure 2. Excess Fund Returns around Year- and Quarter-ends. Panel A: Funds’ average
excess ~of S&P! return on the last day of the year ~“year-end”! and the next day ~“year-
beginning”!, sorted by the percentile of year-to-date return through the second to last day of the
year relative to all funds that year. An excess return of x percent is x percent per day in excess
of the S&P 500. Year-ends run from 198506 through 199607. Panel B: Funds’ average excess ~of
S&P! return on the last day of the quarter ~“quarter-end”! and the next day ~“quarter-
beginning”!, sorted by the percentile of quarter-to-date return through the second to last day of
the quarter relative to all funds that quarter. Fourth quarters are excluded. An excess return
of x percent is x percent per day in excess of the S&P 500. Quarter-ends run from first quarter
1985 through second quarter 1997.
Evidence of Gaming Behavior in Equity Mutual Funds 677winner portfolio and the rest to the loser portfolio.11 Daily returns on each
portfolio are calculated, and the dependent variable is the winner return
minus the loser return. We then regress this winner minus loser return on
the quarter- and year-end indicator variables from Tables I and II and re-
port these results in Panel A of Table IV.
As expected, there is a strong reversal in year-end returns for the top
performing funds. The top 10 overall funds outperform other funds by an
extra 42 bp on the last day of the year, and underperform these funds by an
extra 29 bp on the subsequent day. These results bear out the cross-sectional
prediction of the leaning-for-the-tape model. Within categories, we find mixed
significance, with three of the six p-values registering below five percent.
Stronger results across categories than within categories are possible
because the winners within a period’s worse-performing categories are rel-
atively less likely to make the across-category, that is, universe-relative, top-
ten list. Whether category-relative performance has more or less influence
than universe-relative performance has not been settled in the flow0
performance literature, as Chevalier and Ellison ~1997! group growth and
growth-and-income funds together in their analysis and Brown, Harlow, and
Starks ~1996! study only the category of growth-oriented funds. Our results
are consistent with universe-relative performance having more influence,
though it could also be that investors do not care about the CRSP fund
categorization.
The quarter-end results in Panel A of Table IV are weak, but since the
dependent variable is trailing 252-day return, this is not surprising. Pre-
sumably, investors focus on quarterly returns at quarter ends. We resolve
this by estimating the same model, but using the winner minus loser fund
returns over the prior 63 days as the dependent variable. We present these
results in Panel B of Table IV.
Once again, the cross section of quarterly performance predicts the cross
section of quarter-end inflation. The quarter’s top 10 performers run up an
extra 17 bp at the quarter end and drop an extra 25 bp on the next day. The
shape of the cross-sectional variation is apparent in Figure 2B, which is the
same as Figure 2A except that funds are sorted on quarter-to-date perfor-
mance up to the second-to-last day, and the quarters represented are the
first, second, and third calendar quarters only.
11 Results are very similar if the winner portfolio is the top 5 percent or top 10 percent of
funds, rather than the top 10 funds. We chose this specification because the number of funds in
each category grows significantly over time, so the number of funds in the top n percent grows
over time, causing the variance of the winner portfolio to fall over time, which makes the test
statistics invalid. For example, there are 96 AG funds in 1985 and 576 AG funds in 1996, so the
number of funds in the top 5 percent goes from 5 to 29 while the number in the bottom 95 per-
cent goes from 91 to 547. Fixing the number of funds in the winner portfolio solves this prob-
lem, and does not cause a similar problem in the loser portfolio because it has so many funds
in it that the additional diversification is trivial.
678 The Journal of FinanceWe conclude that cross-sectional patterns in equity funds support the
leaning-for-the-tape hypothesis. Across funds, we find little relation to lagged
returns unconditionally, but a strong negative relation on the first days of
quarters, indicating a causal relation between the quarter-end rise and the
quarter-beginning fall. We find no evidence for the benchmark-beating hy-
pothesis in the distribution of annual returns. However, we find strong evi-
dence for the leaning-for-the-tape hypothesis in the extra NAV inflation among
the quarter’s and calendar year’s best performing funds.
Table IV
Winner Minus Loser Fund Returns around Month-ends
Panel A: There are four categories c of funds: aggressive growth ~AG!, growth and income ~GI!,
long-term capital gains ~LG!, and all funds put together ~ALL!. Funds are sorted by total return
within category c over the 252 days ending t 2 1. The top 10 are the winner portfolio of funds,
and the rest are the loser portfolio, both equal weighted. The winner return minus the loser
return on t is denoted WMLc,t. We run the regression
WMLc,t 5 b0 1 b1YENDt 1 b2YBEGt 1 b3QENDt 1 b4QBEGt 1 b5MENDt 1 b6MBEGt 1 et.
The independent variables are dummies: YENDt, QENDt, and MENDt are 1 for t 5 last trading
day of the year, quarter ~other than year-end!, and month ~other than quarter-end!, respec-
tively, and YBEGt, QBEGt, and MBEGt indicate the following days, respectively. Figures are in
basis points, and one-sided p-values for whether YEND, QEND, and MEND are significantly
positive and for whether YBEG, QBEG, and MBEG are significantly negative, and two-sided
p-values for the intercept, are below in italics ~in percentages!.
There are 3201 daily return observations in each regression.
Panel B: Same as Panel A except that funds are sorted by total return over the 63 days
ending t 2 1.
Category b0 YEND YBEG QEND QBEG MEND MBEG
Panel A: Funds Sorted by Annual Return
All 0.41 41.88 228.00 19.96 211.00 3.58 0.11
65.22 0.11 2.04 0.65 8.63 23.54 49.11
AG only 1.37 19.64 227.50 11.15 0.64 0.23 21.60
7.63 4.44 0.86 5.03 53.75 47.77 35.35
LG only 0.21 13.90 217.20 10.11 26.20 4.87 21.40
75.51 8.58 4.57 4.54 14.86 9.33 35.65
GI only 20.22 24.20 22.70 0.37 2.42 0.02 1.32
66.51 70.68 36.12 46.79 70.27 49.76 67.98
Panel B: Funds Sorted by Quarterly Return
All 1.15 25.26 258.03 17.25 224.56 1.03 23.25
26.14 62.96 0.05 2.73 0.31 42.59 27.95
AG only 3.33 221.63 251.39 2.33 211.13 25.82 26.00
0.02 94.12 0.01 38.25 7.70 88.65 10.73
LG only 0.18 24.96 231.37 6.54 215.72 2.96 24.35
82.10 65.19 0.51 18.10 1.42 25.16 16.41
GI only 20.83 20.92 23.51 25.50 26.40 22.75 0.03
19.83 53.65 0.02 83.35 12.99 78.38 50.3
Evidence of Gaming Behavior in Equity Mutual Funds 679The next section approaches marking up from the other direction by look-
ing directly at equity trading. We first establish that transactions data show
the footprint of marking up and then test whether the equities held by the
top equity funds show more marking up than other stocks.
IV. Evidence from Equity Transactions
The previous sections offer indirect evidence that fund managers mark up:
NAVs shift up and down as if they were marked up, and the NAVs of funds
with more incentive and ability to mark up shift more. We would like more
direct evidence, like audit trails showing the actual trades these mutual
funds’ managers ordered. Not surprisingly, these audit trails are unavail-
able, so we extract what we can from two large databases that are available:
the Trades-and-Quotes ~TAQ! database of NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq trad-
ing, and the CDA database of funds’ portfolio holdings.
Three main results emerge. First, we find that equity-price inflation is
localized in a short period within the last half-hour before the close. Next,
we find that trading activity is considerably more intense in the last half-
hour of a quarter than it is in the last half-hour of other days. These pat-
terns are predicted by the leaning-for-the-tape hypothesis, and they are not
predicted by any competing models of period-end trading. Finally, tying the
marking activity specifically to mutual funds, we find that equities in the
disclosed portfolios of the best recent performers—the funds marking most
intensively under our hypothesis—show relatively more price inflation than
other equities, even after controlling for equity capitalization and recent
return.
A. Intraday Patterns in Equity Transaction Prices
If, as we hypothesize, the equity-fund inflation results from equity trades
intended to affect the close, the underlying equity-price inflation should occur
near the close. To see if it does, we construct equity-price indices and track
them from the close of the quarter’s penultimate day through to the close of
the next quarter’s first day, checking their value shortly before the quarter’s
close and shortly after the next quarter’s open. The empirical question is
how much of the up0down price pattern is concentrated in this narrow span
of trading.
We first identify all equities in the TAQ database that traded on the pen-
ultimate day, day 22. From these stocks, we create a value-weighted index
~VW!, where each stock is weighted by its day 22 capitalization. We also
create equal-weighted size quintiles using these capitalizations; they are la-
beled small, 2, 3, 4, and large. We use VW to represent broad market indices
such as the S&P 500 and the size-based indices to separate out the effect on
smaller stocks, which are easier targets for marking up. We then calculate
the value of each index as of six moments around the turn of the quarter:
4 p.m. on the day before the last day of the quarter ~day 22!; 10 a.m., 3:30 p.m.,
680 The Journal of Financeand 4 p.m. on the quarter’s last day ~21!; and 10 a.m. and 4 p.m. on the first
day of the next quarter ~day 11!. Each constituent equity is valued at its
last transaction price as of these moments, whether or not it traded since
the previous moment. While this method sometimes uses stale prices, we
find it better than the alternatives of conditioning on trades for each date or
for all dates.
If marking up drives the quarter-end inflation, we should find much of
the day 21 return in the last half-hour, between 3:30 p.m. and 4 p.m. To
investigate, we calculate the price return of each index over each interval for
all six year-ends ~1993 through 1998! and all 20 other quarter-ends ~March
1993 through June 1999! in the TAQ database, then take the respective
averages. Figures 3A ~year-end! and 3B ~other quarters! show the cumula-
tive returns over these periods.
The intraday price surge, especially in the last half-hour, is apparent in
Figure 3A. The size quintiles all show strong price increases after the open
of the last day in both the 10 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. interval and the last 30
minutes, whereas the value-weighted index barely moves. It may seem odd
that there is not an equivalent reversal the next day, but this accords with
the tax-loss selling ~i.e., selling pressure on losers ends with the year! and
window-dressing ~i.e., buying pressure on small stocks begins with the year!
models long associated with the turn of the year.
The results from other quarter-ends are free from tax distortions, and
there we see not only a large last-half-hour surge in the bottom four quin-
tiles, 10 to 50 bp ahead of the market index, but also a similar reversal the
next day. To gauge the statistical significance of these results, we calculate
the last-half-hour portfolio returns on all days, and test whether they are
significantly higher at period-ends. For each full-length ~9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.!
trading day12 t from 1993 to 1999, we sort all stocks that traded on t 2 1 into
quintiles by their capitalization as of the last month-end before t. Then we
calculate, as above, the equal-weighted return rq,t of the quintile q stocks
and the value-weighted return vwt of all stocks from 3:30 p.m. to 4:00 p.m.
of t. We run the regression
rq,t 5 bq,01bq,1vwt 1bq,2YENDt 1 bq,3QENDt 1 bq,4MENDt 1 gq,t, ~5!
where YEND, QEND, and MEND are defined as before. Results are in Table V.
The economic and statistical significance of the last-minute price runups
are easily apparent. The smallest quintile surges over 100 bp in the last
half-hour of the fourth quarter and 26 bp in the last half-hour of other quar-
ters. The effect declines steadily as we move to larger-cap indices, down to
just a few basis points for the largest quintile. These results indicate that
the high quarter-end equity returns are not simply a last-day effect, but
rather the end-of-the-last-day effect that marking up would deliver.
12 This excludes both scheduled short days, such as December 31, 1999, and unscheduled
short days such as the snow-related closing on January 8, 1996.
Evidence of Gaming Behavior in Equity Mutual Funds 681Figure 3. Intraday Stock Returns around Quarter- and Year-ends. Panel A: Intraday
returns around year-ends. Average return of size quintiles and the value-weighted index around
year-ends, 1993 through 1998, in percent. Day 21 is the last trading day of the year, day 22i s
the day before, and day 11 is the day after. 1600 is the 4 p.m. close of trading, 1000 is 10 a.m.,
and 1530 is 3:30 p.m. Panel B: Intraday returns around other quarter-ends. Average return of
capitalization indices around quarter-ends other than year-ends, 301993 through 901999, in
percent. Day 21 is the last trading day of the year, day 22 is the day before, and day 11i st h e
day after. 1600 is the 4 p.m. close of trading, 1000 is 10 a.m., and 1530 is 3:30 p.m.
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The timing of equity-price movements supports the view that the equities
are being marked-up and does not support models that are not specifically
focused on the end of the trading day. But do we see the underlying trading
pattern that marking up would deliver? What would that be? One approach
to marking up would be to submit a buy order just before the close, hoping
for that trade at the ask to be the day’s last. The trade could be any size,
maybe just one share. This approach is simple and requires almost no cash,
but it carries the risk of a sell order slipping in, and the inflation is limited
to the bid0ask spread. If fund managers mark up with this approach, we
should see stocks closing closer to the ask than usual at quarter- and year-ends.
Table V
Abnormal Equity Returns in the Month’s Last 30 Minutes,
in Percent
For every full-length ~i.e., market open from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m.! trading day t in 1993
through 1999, we sort NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq stocks into capitalization quintiles by capi-
talization as of the last month-end before t. We then discard all stocks that did not trade at
least once on day t 2 1. We define the return of a stock in the last 30 minutes of t to be the price
return from its last transaction as of 3:30 p.m. of t ~this could be as old as the previous day! to
its last transaction as of 4:00 p.m. of t ~this could be the same transaction!. The equal-weighted
average, in percent, of these returns for the stocks in capitalization quintile q is rq,t. We also
calculate a value-weighted average, in percent, vwt of the returns. So we have five time series
rq,t, and also the time series vwt, of last-half-hour portfolio returns. For each of the time series
rq,t we run the regression
rq,t 5 bq,01bq,1vwt 1bq,2YENDt 1 bq,3QENDt 1 bq,4MENDt 1 gq,t
where YENDt, QENDt, and MENDt are 1 for t 5 last trading day of the year, quarter ~other
than year-end!, and month ~other than quarter-end!, respectively. P-values for significant dif-
ference from zero are below, in percent and italics. Each regression has 1750 observations, and
returns are in percent; so for example, a coefficient of 1.12 is 112 basis points.
Coefficient
Dependent
Variable bq,0 Int. bq,1 vwt bq,2 YENDt bq,3 QENDt bq,4 MENDt R
2 ~%!
r1,t ~small! 0.17 0.156 1.12 0.26 0.22 22.35
,0.01 ,0.01 ,0.01 ,0.01 ,0.01
r2,t 0.11 0.204 0.61 0.29 0.14 31.76
,0.01 ,0.01 ,0.01 ,0.01 ,0.01
r3,t 0.07 0.279 0.43 0.24 0.13 37.03
,0.01 ,0.01 ,0.01 ,0.01 ,0.01
r4,t 0.04 0.352 0.34 0.16 0.09 46.60
,0.01 ,0.01 ,0.01 ,0.01 ,0.01
r5,t ~big! 0.01 0.643 0.14 0.06 0.02 88.07
,0.01 ,0.01 ,0.01 ,0.01 1.01
Evidence of Gaming Behavior in Equity Mutual Funds 683Another approach would be to submit many buy orders, hoping to move
the market for the stock either by absorbing its short-term liquidity or by
influencing other traders about its value. Success does not turn on exactly
which transaction is the last, and the potential inflation is greater, but it
requires more cash and it risks exposure. Other traders who infer marking
up from the aggressive buys would sense a selling opportunity. This new
liquidity would attenuate price impact, implying more trading—both buyer
and seller initiated—for a given amount of inflation. Since the price impact
would be short-term, this extra trading would occur near the close.13
To test for the first approach, that is, test whether stocks close at the ask
relatively more at quarter-ends and year-ends, we run a regression where
the dependent variable is the fraction of all stocks closing at the ask or
higher, and the explanatory variables are YEND, QEND, and MEND from
above. For each day t of the TAQ data we let ASKt be the fraction of all the
stocks that traded in t whose last transactions were at the best ask or higher
as of the transaction time. From Harris ~1989!, we already expect a high
value of ASK at month ends; the empirical question is whether it is partic-
ularly high for month-ends that are also quarter- or year-ends. We run two
regressions, first on YEND, QEND, and MEND, and then on YEND, QEND,
and YEND 1 QEND 1 MEND to establish the difference of the year- and
quarter-end effects from the month-end effect. In the latter specification,
YEND and QEND capture the marginal effect of being a year- or quarter-
end, beyond being a month-end. The regression results are in Panel A of
Table VI.
The regression replicates the Harris ~1989! result ~in a disjoint sample
period! of high closing at month-ends. The quarter-end effect is even larger,
but the year-end effect—while significantly positive—is actually slightly
smaller. This suggests that the big year- and quarter-end returns of Fig-
ures 3A and 3B result from more than just the direction of the final trade.
To test for the second approach, that is, test whether transaction volume
is relatively high in the last minutes of quarters and years, we run a re-
gression where the dependent variable measures the abnormal trading vol-
ume from 3:30 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. Specifically, we count the number of trades
from 3:30 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. for each full-length trading day t, which we call
ENDVOLt, and then define ENDFRACt to be ENDVOLt divided by the
average ENDVOL over the non-month-end days in the year around t ~i.e.,
from six months before t to six months after!, minus one. So for example if
ENDFRACt 5 0.25, then trading in the last half-hour of t was 25 percent
above normal. We use a period-relative measure of excess trading because of
the large increase in trading activity from 1993 to 1999.14 The explanatory
13 Yet another tactic is to transact after the close, on an after-hours exchange. But this only
affects the NAV if the valuation agent chooses to use such a price. See Finance ~2000! for a
discussion.
14 The number of trades in the last half-hour increases from around 23,000 in early 1993 to
around 200,000 in late 1999.
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Abnormal Equity Trading in the Month’s Last 30 Minutes
For every trading day t in 1993 through 1999, we calculate two statistics from the TAQ database of NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ trading: ASKt,
the fraction of all the stocks that traded in t whose last trade was at or higher than the concurrent best ask, and ENDVOLt, the number of trades
from 3:30 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. on t. If trading did not begin at 9:30 a.m. and end at 4:00 p.m. on t, ENDVOLt is regarded as missing. From ENDVOL,
we create a new statistic ENDFRAC to represent the departure of ENDVOL from normal: for trading day t, ENDFRACt is ENDVOLt divided by
the average of ENDVOL on non-month-end days in the year around t ~i.e., from six months before t to six months after!, minus 1. This variable
can be calculated for t from July 6, 1993, through July 1, 1999. For each trading day t, we also calculate three indicator variables: YENDt is 1
if t is the last trading day of the year, QENDt i s1i ftis the last trading day of a quarter other than the fourth, and MENDt i s1i ftis the last
trading day of a month other than a quarter-end. All are 0 otherwise. P-values for significant difference from zero are below, in percentage and
italics.
Panel A: Dependent Variable is ASKt
ASKt 5 0.217 1 0.0178 YENDt 1 0.0398 QENDt 1 0.0242 MENDt R
2 5 4.5%
0.01 9.60 0.01 0.01 N 5 1767
ASKt 5 0.217 2 0.0065 YENDt 1 0.0155 QENDt 1 0.0242 ~YENDt 1 QENDt 1 MENDt! R
2 5 4.5%
0.01 56.81 3.12 0.01 N 5 1767
Panel B: Dependent Variable is ENDFRACt
ENDFRACt 52 0.0043 1 0.1730 YENDt 1 0.1440 QENDt 1 0.0225 MENDt R
2 5 2.4%
19.21 0.07 0.01 22.73 N 5 1499
ENDFRACt 52 0.0043 1 0.1504 YENDt 1 0.1215 QENDt 1 0.0225 ~YENDt 1 QENDt 1 MENDt! R
2 5 2.4%
19.21 0.54 0.05 22.73 N 5 1499
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5variables are again YEND, QEND, and MEND in the first regression, and
YEND, QEND, and YEND 1 QEND 1 MEND in the second. The regression
results are in Panel B of Table VI.
The regressions find a significantly larger amount of extra trading at year-
ends and quarter-ends—17 percent more at year end, 14 percent more at
other quarter-ends—but only an insignificant 2 percent more at other month-
ends. We can get a sense of the arrival pattern of these extra trades with a
graph. For each year-end, quarter-end, or month-end trading day t, we count
the trades in each minute from 9:30 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., inclusive. Then we
normalize as above: divide the value for a minute by the average value for
that minute in the non-month-end days in the year around t, and subtract
one ~again, we throw out shortened days!. The resulting measure of excess
trading activity is plotted ~averaged over five-minute intervals, to enhance
legibility! as Figure 4.
The graph shows a late burst of trading reaching its highest point in the
last five minutes. The excess-trading measure rises to 27 percent above nor-
mal at year-ends, 16 percent above normal at quarter-ends, and also 7 per-
cent above normal at other month-ends. It is interesting that the year-end
also features extra trading in the middle of the day. Some traders may de-
liberately transact earlier than usual to avoid the New Year’s Eve marking-
up-related price distortions, or to join the office party.
Figure 4. Trading volume on period-end days relative to neighboring non-period-end
days, July 1993 to June 1999. The “year” line shows the average across the six year-ends
from 1993 to 1998, the “quarter” line shows the average across the 18 non-year-end quarter-
ends from September 1993 to June 1999, and the “month” line shows the average across the 48
non-quarter-end month-ends from July 1993 to May 1999.
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The evidence on equity prices and trades strongly suggests that equities
are marked up. An important question that remains is whether mutual fund
managers in particular are involved in this activity. One way to address this
question without observing the actual trades caused by mutual fund man-
agers is to measure the relative inflation of the equities held by the year’s
top-performing funds. We can not generally observe a fund’s portfolio but we
can observe its semiannual or quarterly statutory disclosures in the CDA
database ~see Wermers ~1999! for a description!, which we have from 1989 to
1995. We sort funds by their performance, and then take the constituents of
the top-ranked funds’ disclosures as our proxy for top-fund stocks. The em-
pirical question is whether they are relatively more inflated than other stocks.
To avoid confusion with other potentially important cross-sectional effects,
we control for capitalization and recent return before comparing.
The test is a two-stage procedure. The first stage calculates the inflation
of top-fund stocks at year-end, relative to other stocks with matching capi-
talization and recent performance, and the second stage generates a test
statistic by relating this inflation to its distribution under the null. Because
the 1989 to 1995 span of the CDA portfolio data overlaps with the TAQ
equity-price data for only three year-ends, this test uses instead the CRSP
daily file to measure equity-price movements.
To capture both the initial rise and the subsequent fall caused by marking
up, a stock’s inflation at the close of year y is taken to be its total return on
the last day of y minus its total return on the next day; that is, the first day
of year y 1 1 ~note that this is twice the average price inflation!.15 A fund is
a top fund for year y if it ranks in the top 10 percent for the year up to the
second-to-last day of y. A stock is a top-fund stock for year y if it is in a top
fund’s last disclosed portfolio for y. For each year y from 1989 to 1995, we
sort all stocks by second-to-last day capitalization into size quintiles, and by
return over the six months16 ending with the second-to-last day into perfor-
mance quintiles, yielding 5 3 5 5 25 size- and performance-controlled groups
of stocks. We sort each group into a long-short zero-cost portfolio: long in the
group’s top-fund stocks and short in all the others ~equal-weighted on both
sides!. The final step of the first stage is to calculate the inflation of each
portfolio: the portfolio’s return on the last day of y minus its return on the
first day of y 1 1. Let INFLi, j, y be the inflation of the size-quintile i,
performance-quintile j portfolio in year y ~if there are no top-fund stocks in
quintiles i and j for year y, INFLi, j, y is regarded as missing!. Because INFL
15 For example, if a 11 percent return on the last day of year y is followed by a 20.5 percent
return on the first day of year y 1 1, the average inflation is 0.75 percent, and INFL is 1.5
percent.
16 Six months is the standard reference period for tax-loss selling; results are very similar if
we use 12 months instead.
Evidence of Gaming Behavior in Equity Mutual Funds 687is constructed to represent the relative inflation of top-fund stocks, control-
ling for size and performance, the empirical question is whether INFL is
significantly positive.
In the second stage we calculate, for each i, j, and y, the distribution of
INFLi, j, y under the null by calculating the analogous statistic in all the
other nonoverlapping two trading day periods of year y. Under the null hy-
pothesis that INFLi, j, y comes from the same distribution that we observe
in the rest of the year, INFLi, j, y minus the mean of these observations and
divided by their standard deviation, which we denote STD_INFLi, j, y,i s
approximately standard normal.17 Assuming independence across years,
STD_INFLi, j, y summed over the n years for which it is available and di-
vided by n102 is also approximately standard normal. And finally, assuming
independence across and within years, STD_INFLi, j, y summed across any n
combinations of i, j, and y and divided by n
102 is approximately standard
normal.
We run three categories of tests. First, we test for each i and j whether the
top-fund stocks in size-quintile i and performance-quintile j are relatively
more inflated by summing STD_INFLi, j, y across the n years of available
data, dividing the result by n
102, and comparing the result to the standard
normal distribution. Second, we test whether the top-fund stocks in size-
quintile i are relatively more inflated by summing over both j and y ~and
dividing appropriately! and whether the top-fund stocks in performance quin-
tile j are relatively more inflated by summing over i and y. Third, we test
whether top-fund stocks in general are relatively more inflated by summing
over i, j, and y. In Table VII we report, for each test, the average of INFL,
the sum of STD_INFL divided by n
102, and the p-value for this quantity
from the standard normal distribution.
The overall test statistic in the bottom right of Table VII indicates that
top-fund stocks are significantly more inflated, controlling for size and re-
cent performance, with a point estimate of INFL equal to 51 bp, correspond-
ing to an average inflation of about 25 bp. The size-quintile results in the
rightmost column show the most significance in the mid-cap area, whereas
the performance-quintile results find significance at both extremes. The larger
estimates for losers are intuitive, in the sense that a top fund would target
stocks that its high-performing competitors would be least likely to hold,
and these would be losers, not winners. Because we observe this abnormal
performance in the specific holdings of top equity mutual funds, the evi-
dence strongly suggests marking-up activity by mutual fund managers. While
mutual funds might not be generating the entire marking-up effect, they
appear to at least be one of the major contributors to it.
17 The exact distribution is Student-t with degrees of freedom ~df! equal to the number of
observations. We use this approximation because the t with around 50 df is very close to stan-
dard normal, and because the number of observations changes slightly from one year to the
next.
688 The Journal of FinanceV. Summary and Conclusion
The results of this paper relate to a variety of research areas, investor
concerns, and regulatory issues. We summarize each briefly.
Table VII
Year-end Overvaluation:
Winner-fund versus Non-winner-fund Stocks
Each year from 1989 to 1995, stocks are sorted into five performance quintiles by six-month
return up to the second-to-last day of the year, and five size quintiles by capitalization as of the
second-to-last day of the year. This yields 25 size0performance groups, and stocks within each
group are arranged into a zero-cost portfolio, long in the stocks that were in the most recently
~as of December 31 of that year! disclosed portfolio of one of the top 10 percent ~by performance!
equity funds of the year ~through the second-to-last day! and short the remaining stocks in this
group. For size-quintile i and performance-quintile j, the last-day-of-year-y return minus the
first-day-of-year-y 1 1 return is labeled INFLi, j, y. We calculate the same statistic for every
two-day period in year y. We define STD_INFLi, j, y as INFLi, j, y minus the mean of these divided
by the standard deviation of the two-day returns over year y. In the 6 3 6 matrix of cells in the
table, the cell in row i and column j, i, j from one to five, shows the average of INFLi, j, y over
the n available yearly observations, and under that the sum of STD_INFLi, j, y divided by n
102
~labeled Stdinfl! and under that, in italics and percent, the p-value from the standard normal
distribution for the null hypothesis that the true mean is not positive. In the last column, we
calculate the average of INFLi, j, y and sum of STD_INFLi, j, y divided by n
102 over all the yearly
observations across returns groups within each capitalization quintile ~i.e., over y and j!. Sim-
ilarly, in the last row, we average and sum across capitalization groups within each return
quintile. In the bottom right corner, we report the results from averaging and summing all the
yearly observations across both capitalization and returns quintiles, that is, every observation.
Return ~in percent!
Capitalization 1 ~low! 234 5 ~ high! All
1 ~low! 1.75 6.30 24.15 1.49 22.27 0.87
stdinfl 1.808 3.681 20.880 0.455 20.715 2.113
p-val 3.53 0.01 81.05 32.46 76.28 1.73
2 1.17 20.33 21.39 0.06 1.21 0.16
stdinfl 0.794 20.584 21.663 0.025 0.343 20.471
p-val 21.35 72.04 95.19 48.98 36.60 68.11
3 1.14 0.41 0.12 1.01 1.34 0.80
stdinfl 2.668 2.221 20.227 2.493 2.638 4.379
p-val 0.38 1.32 58.98 0.63 0.42 ,0.01
4 0.87 0.94 0.81 0.75 0.63 0.80
stdinfl 1.658 3.356 4.232 3.509 3.141 7.109
p-val 4.86 0.04 ,0.01 0.02 0.08 ,0.01
5 ~high! 20.55 0.13 20.00 20.00 0.23 20.04
stdinfl 21.487 0.497 20.205 20.005 0.894 20.137
p-val 93.15 30.95 58.14 50.19 18.58 55.44
All 0.88 1.20 20.60 0.62 0.35 0.51
stdinfl 2.433 3.961 0.758 3.073 2.986 5.919
p-val 0.75 0.00 22.43 0.10 0.15 ,0.01
Evidence of Gaming Behavior in Equity Mutual Funds 689A. Investor Decision Making
We provide evidence that equity-fund prices are significantly inflated at
the ends of quarters, especially the end of the year. The implied profit op-
portunity is large—several hundred basis points per year for small-stock
funds—and transactions costs are zero, so it is tempting to conclude that
investors should buy into equity funds on the second-to-last day of each
quarter, and sell the next day, thereby capturing the entire inflation as profit
with little risk. But, considering the latitude of mutual fund complexes to
deny abusive transactions, this trading rule is not realistic. Alternatively,
investors can simply not buy at the end of a quarter, but wait one day and
buy at the beginning of the next quarter. This might seem a minor concern—
who is investing on New Year’s Eve anyway?—but it is potentially serious
because month-ends are common investment dates in automated investment
plans.18
B. Principal/Agent Issues in Money Management
We show that money managers respond to the incentive to move return
between periods by marking up their portfolios. This is similar to the obser-
vations that money managers respond to the incentive to boost variance
~Brown et al. ~1996!, Chevalier and Ellison ~1997!! and to the incentive to
disclose lower-risk portfolios ~Haugen and Lakonishok ~1988!, Musto ~1997,
1999!!. It is noteworthy that the incentive to mark up comes from the same
source as the incentive to boost variance, which is the convex relation be-
tween net new investment and performance. This relation is more sensitive
to the difference between good returns, consistent with the greater evidence
of marking up among the best recent performers, and it is not sensitive to
beating the S&P 500 or zero, consistent with the lack of evidence of marking
up for that purpose. While previous studies suggested that portfolio man-
agers window dress their portfolios as a reaction to either implicit or explicit
incentive compensation contracts, our evidence indicates that some funds
actively manipulate prices of stocks they hold, which is a completely differ-
ent ball game.
C. Regulation
Marking up by mutual fund managers is considered illegal. Should more
be done to stop it? Several considerations are important. For one thing, the
aggregate monetary effect of marking up across a fund’s investors is zero.
That is, all profits to or losses from these investors selling or buying at
inflated prices are borne by existing or remaining investors. Of course, one
18 Paycheck transfers could, in principle, contribute to the inflation if they are redirected to
recent winners, but this would presumably be symmetric across month-ends ~possibly account-
ing for some of the Ariel ~1987! result!, not concentrated at quarter-ends.
690 The Journal of Financegroup of investors does systematically lose to another. For example, inves-
tors automatically contributing at month-ends will systematically lose to those
investing the next day.
Even if nobody transacts at the funds’ inflated prices, there is still the
issue of the inflated returns overstating the fund’s performance for the year,
potentially misleading investors.19 One possible regulatory solution is to re-
quire full disclosure to investors of trades executed on the last day of calen-
dar quarters. But considering how little information past performance imparts
about future performance, this is not a first-order concern. Also, the elimi-
nation of marking up by mutual fund managers would not solve all the prob-
lems related to marking up if other institutional money managers such as
hedge fund managers continue to mark up. If they mark up the stocks held
by a mutual fund that does not mark up, that fund will experience the con-
sequences of price inflation anyhow.
Regulatory response to marking up appears to be more active in Canada.
The Ontario Securities Commission collected a C$75,000 settlement from
Altamira, a fund management company, with respect to allegations of mark-
ing up in 1993 and 1994 ~Market manipulation: Part 3, 2000!. And just
recently it collected a C$3.08 million settlement from RT Capital Manage-
ment, which admitted month-end and quarter-end marking up ~called “high
closing” in Canada! between October 1998 and March 1999 ~Royal Bank to
pay, 2000!. In the later investigation, fund managers were suspected of using
outside accounts for marking up trades, in which case the trading activity of
their funds would reveal no evidence of wrongdoing ~Royal Bank pension
arm probed, 2000!.
D. Turn-of-the-year Returns
The two explanations for the out-performance of small stocks in early Jan-
uary are tax-loss selling and window dressing. Empirical tests of the models
document a shift on the year’s last trading day toward buyer-originated trans-
actions ~Lakonishok and Smidt ~1984!, Ritter ~1988!!, but the models them-
selves do not specifically predict the pattern. In contrast, our model predicts
the shift, as well as its concentration in the last minutes of the year. Fur-
ther, our model predicts the same effects at other quarter-ends, which we
observe. One interpretation of our results is that the tax-loss selling and
window-dressing effects in small stocks just after the year-end would be
even larger had small stock prices not been artificially raised at year end.
E. Market Microstructure
The usual perspective on an investor purchasing a security is that he wants
the lowest price and the least impact. The extra trading volume and price
movement we document suggests contradictory preferences at work at quarter-
19 As Moskowitz ~2000! observes, our results can explain why funds’ stock picks do so much
better in December than in any other month.
Evidence of Gaming Behavior in Equity Mutual Funds 691and year-ends. Consequently, research that lumps quarter-end trading with
trading in normal circumstances could mismeasure the execution quality
and market impact that institutional investors can expect in normal circum-
stances. The direction of the mismeasurement is an interesting question,
similar to the one addressed by Kyle ~1985!; it may be especially hard to
move the market when other traders expect marking up, so that the market
impact of a given purchase is actually smaller.
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